We develop a conceptual asset-based framework of credit creation based on three leading variables: (i) the amount of assets acceptable as collateral, (ii) the level of leverage and (iii) the level of trust. As credit expands along these dimensions in a non-linear dynamic, the financial system becomes more liquid. At the same time, it becomes more prone to endogenous feedbacks and vulnerable to internally generated instabilities manifested as booms and busts. Applying this framework to the global financial crisis, we show that the subprime crisis was both a signature and only one possible trigger in an increasingly unstable financial system. Using historical data, we demonstrate a significant shift in the components of US bank balance sheets and a decoupling of bank assets from deposits since the mid-1980s, marking the rise of "securitized-fractional reserve banking". The subsequent decades were a period of growing leverage, with debt-securities assuming money-like functions and serving as collateral for further credit creation. As trust began to recede, the high levels of leverage were no more viable, precipitating a reduction of the amount of assets acceptable as collateral, and leading to a contraction in credit and to liquidity spirals. We discuss the potential general applicability of this framework of credit creation and define extensions in future research.
Introduction
"It's obvious that many commenters don't get the distinction between the proposition that banks create money -which every economics textbook, mine included, says they do (that's what the money multiplier is all about) -and the proposition that their ability to create money is not constrained by the monetary base. Sigh. … . Bank loan officers can't just issue checks out of thin air; like employees of any financial intermediary, they must buy assets with funds they have on hand." Paul Krugman, March 30, 2012 "Based on how monetary policy has been conducted for several decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit whenever they like. They don't need a pile of "dry tinder" in the form of excess reserves to do so."
William C. Dudley, July 29, 2009 Although credit existed prior to money (Graeber, 2011) and research identifies it as a key driver in the history of financial crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Schularick & Taylor, 2012) , contradicting explanations persist on how credit is created, how it can be influenced and how it impacts the economy. In mainstream economics textbooks, credit creation by banks is generally understood to arise from their function as intermediaries between savers and borrowers within the fractional reserve banking system. Accordingly, savers deposit their money with banks, which keep some of it as reserves while lending out the rest, thereby creating loans and multiplying the amount of money available to the economy. 1 Accordingly, the amount of lending and multiplication of money is constrained by the availability of prior deposits and reserves. This view is contradicted by scholars and practitioners arguing that banks do not need prior deposits but can create credit and money ex nihilo. The idea can be traced back at least as far as Schumpeter, who emphasized that banks' ability to create credit arises not from the transfer of existing purchasing power but through "the creation of new purchasing power out of nothing" (Schumpeter, [1912 (Schumpeter, [ ], 1934 ; see also Schumpeter, [1954 Schumpeter, [ ], 2016 .
Indeed, practice shows that banks generally lend first and acquire the necessary financing later. Moreover, the creation of a new loan on the asset side of a bank's balance sheet requires the corresponding accounting entry of a deposit as its liability. From this perspective, banks create deposits through creating loans and do not create loans from pre-existing deposits (McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014) . This balance-sheet perspective also reveals that banks do not and cannot lend out reserves to deposit holders. Banks can lend reserves to each other and can borrow reserves from the central bank, but they do not lend out reserves to deposit holders when making a loan (Keister & McAndrews, 2009; Sheard, 2013) . However, the balance-sheet process of loans creating deposits does not mean that banks can create their own funding indefinitely. For example, when the proceeds of the loan are transferred elsewhere and the issuing bank lacks sufficient reserves, it must borrow either in the money markets or from the central bank. But when a bank acquires financing in the money markets, essentially, that money comes from a prior deposit with another bank or non-bank. The debate of whether loans are created out of nothing or from prior deposits, hence, goes around in circles. In this context, it is helpful to think of money creation in terms of hierarchies, where "what is money is determined by the workings of the economy, and usually there is a hierarchy of monies, with special money instruments for different purposes" (Minsky, 1986, p. 255) . From a hierarchical perspective, what is money at one level is merely credit for the level above (Mehrling, 2012a) . For example, although commercial banks can create money for the general public (deposits), they cannot create their own medium of payment (reserves), which are liabilities that can only be created by the central bank.
The role of money and credit in determining economic growth differs within various economic schools and with it its emphasis throughout the history of economic thought. For Fisher (1936) , a one-third reduction in the stock of bank money was the principle cause of the Great Depression between 1929 and 1939. Like Schumpeter, he stressed that banks create money by "pen and ink" (p. 16). In his view, booms and depressions could be greatly reduced through a banking reform that would require banks to hold 100% in reserves and that would consequentially mitigate inflations and deflations. This perspective neglects the importance of market-based lending (rather than bank-based lending) and its potential impact on financial stability. Since then, the mainstream consensus is that of long run neutrality of money and short-term non-neutrality (for a review and reconciliation of this mainstream consensus since Fisher and Wicksell, see Blanchard, 2000) . Consistent with the view of intermediation, banks as such have been absent in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that were used by central banks to inform their monetary policy in the run up to the global financial crisis that started in 2007.
The key mechanisms of expansion and contraction are positive feedbacks (related to "procyclicality"), which result from the interaction between agents within the financial and economic system (e.g. Boyer, 2013) . This interaction is driven, for example, by our human tendency for impulsive action, cognitive biases, imitation and herding. In economics, these behavioral tendencies are perhaps best known as "animal spirits" (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009; Keynes, 1936) . Moreover, institutional regulations and conventions can encourage or discourage positive feedbacks. For example, Biondi (2015) models the impact of different accounting regimes on financial market stability and finds that historical cost accounting, compared to the more procyclical mark-to-market accounting, stabilizes the financial system by lowering share price volatility and market exuberance. Positive feedbacks create instabilities that arise endogenously within the system and manifest in boom-bust dynamics, as previously described by Minsky (Minsky 1986; 1992) and others. Indeed, laboratory experiments have demonstrated that bubbles can form in the absence of asymmetric information and just on the basis of interactions between agents (Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, & Tuinstra, 2009; Hüsler, Sornette, & Hommes, 2013) . The interaction of agents within the economic and financial systems eventually leads to a critical stage, a bifurcation, at which the behavior of the system no longer follows its past trajectory but changes into a different state. At this "critical point", there are multiple possible triggers (often small in amplitude compared with their consequences), which can prompt the system to change regime. The eventual trigger is not the cause of instability but the result of endogenous processes leading to a build-up of instability (Scheffer, 2009) . Mathematically, this can be formulated as super-exponential growth leading to "finite time singularity" lying within some critical time interval, at which the prior trajectory of the regime cannot continue and changes its direction (Sornette, 2003; Sornette & Cauwels, 2015a ). The precise instant of the critical point is contingent on details of the system design as well as initial and boundary conditions. What is expected to be more generic, according to the corresponding theory of bifurcations, is the existence of a small number of characteristic precursors, such as accelerated expected prices, increasing susceptibility to external shocks due to raising reflexivity (Filimonov, Bicchetti, Maystre, & Sornette, 2014; Filimonov & Sornette, 2012) and slower recovery after perturbations (Scheffer, 2009; Sornette & Cauwels, 2015b) .
While risk transformations make the financial system more liquid and more complete, they can develop endogenous instabilities due to feedback between asset prices and trading strategies. What seems to be more efficient on an individual level can increase the risk for the system as a whole (Haldane & May, 2011; Chernov & Sornette, 2016) . For example, in an analysis of credit networks, Battiston et al. (Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, & Stiglitz, 2012a; Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, & Stiglitz, 2012b) find that, while increased connectivity reduces individual risk because of risk sharing, it increases the fragility of the system and systemic risk as a whole. Consequently, we suggest that, as credit creation expands, financial markets approach a point of "criticality" at which even tiny perturbations can trigger a significant change in regime (Sornette, 2003; Sornette & Cauwels, 2015a) .
First variable: The amount of acceptable collateral assets
We stipulate that potential credit creation depends on the availability of assets qualifying as collaterals for loans. From an economic perspective, an asset can be defined as "a resource with a market value" or "a unit of wealth capable of earning an income" (, 2013) . The latter description indicates that, in the absence of a readily observable market value, the value of an asset is based on the expected capability to generate an income in the future, even if it does not yet generate any cash. From an accounting perspective, an asset can be defined as "any object, tangible or intangible, that is of value to its possessor. In most cases it either is cash or can be turned into cash" (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 2010). Considering the hierarchical nature of institutions, what is an asset depends on where in the hierarchy one stands. For example, from the viewpoint of the deposit holder (the possessor), the deposit (cash) is an asset, but from the viewpoint of the bank this deposit is a liability. Depending on the degree of acceptability (Foley, 1989) , some assets can function as a means of payment (money) and others as collateral for a promise to pay (credit). For example, the deposit holder may also own a life insurance or a portfolio of securities, which are not acceptable as a means of payment but that can serve as collateral, for example, for a Lombard loan 2 Finally, from a legal perspective, an asset has been defined as "real or personal property, whether tangible or intangible, that has financial value and can be used for the payment of its owner's debts" (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2008) . This definition points to a direct link between assets and credit. Moreover, the origin of the word asset has been attributed to having "enough (to pay obligations)" (The Random House Dictionary, 2016) .
It is important to note that what makes an asset eligible as collateral is subject to change over time, reflecting the institutions, regulations and conventions of that time. The amount of available collateral is consequently influenced by factors such as financial regulation, accounting rules and technology. For example, bank regulation that allows securities lending, rehypothecation and proprietary trading is likely to increase the amount of eligible assets available. Credit creation across institutional hierarchies relies on double-entry bookkeep-ing, and mark-to-market accounting can increase the procyclicality between asset prices and the demand for them. Moreover, advances in technology enabled assets to become more virtual and tradable across ever shorter timescales, thus potentially increasing the availability of assets. Finally, institutional actions by central banks, governments or rating agencies can impact both the acceptability and availability of assets serving as collateral.
Within our framework, any loan is given explicitly or implicitly against an asset posted as collateral. These can be tangible, such as property or securities, or intangible, such as the talent (human capital) of an entrepreneur, or the future professional income resulting from the investment in education in the context of a student loan. The asset-backed view is obvious when considering explicitly and legally secured loans like repos or mortgages. However, in our framework it also applies to so-called "unsecured" loans: in consumer financing, for example, credit is given to people only with high credit scores. Their ability to generate future income from a job and their history of meeting previous credit obligations implicitly secure the loan. 3 In this sense, our framework merges (implicitly collateralized) cash flow based lending and (explicitly) collateralized lending. In the most extreme and too often trodden examples of history, borrowers themselves, or members of their family, have served as collaterals for a loan by serving as slaves (Graeber, 2011 ). An asset, defined in this broad sense, is hence dependent on the creditor's risk perception of the debtor's ability to fulfill his side of the exchange in the future (e. g., in goods, services or money). From this perspective, credit is never created "out of nothing" but always takes place in the presence of existing assets and the expectation of future cash flows. The expression of "out of nothing" just reflects a lack of accounting for the not directly observable assets that are present as collateral in one form or another.
Second variable: The level of leverage
On the one hand, the level of leverage refers to the level of debt obtained against some kind of asset. For example, how much a retail customer can borrow against his or her house, how much an entrepreneur can borrow against his or her shares or how much a financial intermediary can borrow against its securities. To the extent that securities can be borrowed and rehypothecated, the same set of securities (collateral assets) can be leveraged multiple times. As shown above, assets derive their worth either through a market value or from their expected capability of earning an income. Both can be used for the payment of its owner's debts. Therefore, on the other hand, the level of leverage must also measure the ability to meet cash flow obligations with the income that is generated from various assets. This was key to Minsky (1992) inherent instability hypothesis, which defined different stages of leverage as either hedged, speculative, or Ponzi finance. 4 From this income-debt perspective, entities without any equity constraints, such as for example a mutual fund or a national government, can become insolvent simply through liquidity shortfalls and in the absence of changing asset values. Minsky defined his three stages of finance as a progression towards increasing instability, fuelled by ever lower perceptions of risk (our third variable discussed below) during boom phases. This neglects the fact that it may be natural and necessary for economic units to be in either speculative or Ponzi state at some point in time. Consequently, Biondi (2013) suggested that Minsky's stages of finance should not be understood in a normative sense but rather as natural conditions that expose the interdependent states between the economy and finance. Moreover, he argued that, in this interdependent context, Minsky's analysis may be better served by an entity rather than by an ownership approach. The perspective would shift from that of ownership of capital to that of creditor-debtor relationships. This would consequently require a dynamic rather than a static view of accounting. A dynamic understanding of leverage, which takes into consideration its development over time and space from the perspective of economic entities, is therefore consistent with our dynamic framework of credit creation.
Third variable: The level of trust and confidence
In this asset-based framework, trust and confidence 5 are where the expansion and contraction of credit creation start. They are prerequisites for the expansion of assets acceptable as collaterals (first variable) and the leveraging of assets (second variable). Financial prices and economic values are based fundamentally on trust (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006) . They are not based on fancy mathematical formulas or on subtle, self-consistent, efficient economic equilibriums. Rather, they are built on trust in the future, trust in economic growth, trust in the ability of debtors to face their liabilities, trust in financial institutions to play their role as multipliers of economic growth, trust that your money in a bank account can be redeemed at any time you choose and trust in the ability to refinance when necessary. Consistent with our institutional and hierarchical perspective, Swedberg (2010) identifies two different types of confidence in finance: "investor confidence" and "confidence in the State" (Government and/or Central bank). The former could be regarded as counterparty-specific and the latter as a broader sense of trust in the willingness and ability of a more powerful institution to stabilize the situation in times of crisis. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) argued that confidence cannot be predicted rationally and is "the first and most crucial" of animal spirits (p. 14). Moreover, spikes in risk perception can take place in the absence of significant changes in fundamentals and can lead to "self-fulfilling shifts in risk" due to feedbacks between the current asset price and risk about the future asset price (Bacchetta, Tille, & Wincoop, 2012) . Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) showed that uncertainty about expected economic growth affects investor beliefs and consequently influences asset prices and risk premiums. They found that the "confidence risk channel" is able to explain large negative price moves in the absence of fundamental changes in macroeconomic variables. The importance of "risk perception" and its feedback on asset values is also present in Borio and Zhu (2012) , who find that "the mutually reinforcing feedback between perceptions of value and risk, on the one hand, and financing constraints and "liquidity", on the other, has arguably become more prominent. Under some circumstances, it may therefore also contribute to amplifying business fluctuations more than in the past" (p. 248).
Financial stability, in general, and credit creation, in particular, requires trust and confidence. This is evident in our history of monetary regimes, which have shifted between commodity money and credit money. The former was associated with periods of war and low levels of trust, as it could be more easily used to settle with strangers and pay travelling soldiers. The latter generally involved repeating interactions within a community, and therefore required higher levels of trust and was present primarily in peaceful times (Graeber, 2011) . Trust and confidence can be facilitated by transparency or by guarantees from trusted institutions perceived to have the necessary resources. One example is the effective elimination of traditional bank-runs through the introduction of deposit insurance. Another example is evidence that suggests that repo margins in the tri-party market, i. e., using a clearing house, were much more stable than those in the bilateral market (Copeland, Martin, & Walker, 2014) .
Application to the global financial crisis

The great leveraging: A maturation towards instability
The decades preceding the global financial crisis were characterized by an increasingly large and more connected banking sector and by a build-up in debt in most advanced economies. The extent of this build-up is unprecedented in the history of more than a century and has thus been coined "The Great Leveraging" (Taylor, 2012) .
Historical data show that the number of US banks steadily increased under the free banking and national banking era (from under 800 banks to over 25,000 between 1834 and 1913) and plateaued at around 15,000 banks after the introduction of deposit insurance. Since the mid-1980s, the number of US banks has been declining steadily ( Figure 1 ). This decline in the number of banks, however, has been accompanied by a strong increase in bank assets. For example, a study by the Federal Reserve of St Louis shows that between 1984 and 2011, the number of US commercial banks halved, while average inflation-adjusted assets held increased from US$ 167 million to US$ 839 million. The concentration is even more evident at the top, as in 2011 "the five largest banks held 48 percent of total [US banking] system assets. Four banks had total assets in excess of $1 trillion each, and the largest commercial bank-JPMorgan Chase Bank-had $1.8 trillion of assets, equal to 14 percent of the total assets of all U.S. commercial banks" (Wheelock, 2012) . Commercial banks in the United States and Britain held about 5% equity against their assets. Interestingly, these levels have persisted since post-WWII, reaching this level at the end of a steady downward trend developing in the nineteenth century prior to the rise of shadow banking (the US equity-to-asset ratio around 1870 was 35% and this has steadily declined since). 6 Moreover, the decades preceding the financial crisis of 2008 were characterized by globally increasing debt levels in the private and public sectors, which grew fastest in the advanced economies. For example, in the United Kingdom, the compounded annual growth rate of debt to GDP was 3.3% between 1990 and 2000, accelerating to 5.2% between 2000 and 2008, a total increase of 157% over the entire period. In the US, the percentage of household debt to disposable income has been steadily rising and grew particularly fast after 2000, from a level of approximately 90% to 130% before 2008 (Roxburgh et al. 2012; . In the run up to the financial crisis, private sector nonfinancial debt in Western countries rose by an average of 43% between the beginning of 2004 and the beginning of 2009. 7 Considering these figures, credit evidently financed much of the economic growth over recent decades. This general trend continued also in the aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis, with global debt growing by US$ 57 trillion between 2007 and 2014, outpacing world GDP growth in the same period (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel, & Mutafchieva, 2015) .
It is important to stress that the decades preceding the financial crisis were also accompanied by lower variability in prices and output, low unemployment and low inflation, generally referred to as "The Great Moderation". This calm period gave policymakers confidence in their ability to steer the economy; risk perception was low and financial crises thought to be a thing of the past. The rise in leverage described above was hence also accompanied by an increase in confidence and trust. It shows that during the process of expansion, we tend to be oblivious to the internal risks building up, especially if credit and banks are excluded from our macroeconomic thinking. It is consequently not surprising that policymakers initially failed to grasp the wider global implications of what started as a relatively small local subprime crisis. 8 Finally, these decades have also been characterized by an increasing financialization of assets. In the United States, the growth in financial assets developed approximately at the same rate as GDP until the 1980s, when it accelerated at a much faster rate. According to some estimates, global financial stock increased from 54 to 212 trillion US$ between 1990 and 2010. This corresponds to a financial depth (global financial stock over GDP) of 263% and 356%, respectively. 9 Another study estimates the value of global financial assets in 2010 at about US$ 600 trillion (including those on financial intermediaries' balance sheets) compared with US$ 210 trillion of nonfinancial assets. 10 Of course, not all of these financial assets are eligible as collateral. However, the availability of assets has increased substantially with deeper financialization and wealth held in liquid financial assets, such as in debt instruments and derivatives thereof, which have become acceptable collateral for credit creation.
In summary, prior to the financial crisis, we could observe (1) an increase in eligible collateral for credit creation through the financialization of assets, (2) increasingly leveraged economies in most advanced countries, and (3) a sustained period of trust seemingly validated by "The Great Moderation". These trends, which have been mostly present since the mid-1980s, have been accompanied by an unprecedentedly large and globally connected financial sector. These observations are consistent with findings that financial liberalization has "greatly facilitated the access to credit. It has therefore also increased the scope for perceptions of wealth and risk to drive the economy, more easily supported by external funding. More than just metaphorically, we have shifted from a cash flow-constrained to an asset-backed global economy" (Borio, 2006, p. 4, emphasis original). 11 Instrumental to this development has been the rise of what we call "securitized fractional reserve banking".
The rise of securitized fractional reserve banking
With "securitized fractional reserve banking", we refer to credit creation that is not just financed through bank deposits but through short-term loans among primarily institutional investors, including non-bank financial intermediaries. Our terminology builds on Gorton and Metrick (Gorton & Metrick 2010; who likened the financial crisis of 2007/2008 to a bank run not on deposits in the traditional banking sector but to a run on repo in "securitized banking". However, rather than isolating the practice of bundling, tranching and reselling loans through the issuance of asset-backed securities, we take a broader view and consider the overall practice of "securitizing" (financializing) assets through the creation of tradable securities. Securitized fractional reserve banking thus includes traditional commercial banks and extends to what has been described as the shadow banking system. Shadow banking is commonly defined as credit intermediation outside the traditional banking system, outside the light of regulators and without public enhancement such as deposit insurance and without explicit/direct access to central bank liquidity (e.g. FSB, 2011; Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, & Boesky 2012; . 12 It has also been described as "money market funding of capital market lending", which can take place on the balance sheet of banks and that of other financial institutions (Mehrling, Pozsar, Sweeney, & Neilson, 2013) . 13 The discussion of money creation "out of nothing", as outlined in the introduction of this paper, has centered around commercial banks. This is usually justified with the argument that market-based lending merely transfers purchasing power while deposit-creating bank lending increases purchasing power. Consequently, only bank-based credit creation is perceived to be "special" and relevant to financial stability. By that logic, bank-based economies should be more prone to financial instability than market-based economies. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, market-based systems seem to be particularly prone to positive feedbacks. "Securitized fractional reserve banking" thus refers to bank-based and market-based lending in the traditional banking sector as well as the wider system of financial intermediaries, including the shadow banking system (Table 1) . Although other financial intermediaries such as dealers or asset managers do not hold reserves at the central bank, the market-based system is also inherently fractional due to collateral chains and marginbased lending. Whereas banks create money (deposits) through granting loans, dealers create securities that can function like money (for example, they can be used as a means of payment in mergers or they may be held as a substitute for bank deposits). In traditional banking, deposits can be converted into currency, and there are always more deposits outstanding than there is currency. In shadow banking, dealers convert securities into deposits, and there are always more money-like securities outstanding than there are deposits. Both systems are consequently prone to runs in times of crisis. What is special about the securities-based bank run is the positive feedback between market liquidity and funding liquidity. Whereas banks must convert deposits into currency at par, dealers convert securities into deposits at a price. When short-term funding (e.g. repo or other instruments) is withdrawn, the borrower can sell assets (liquid securities) to raise the necessary cash to pay back its liabilities. This can put prices and market liquidity of securities under pressure, leading to losses on the asset side of the borrower as well as that of lenders (e.g. global asset managers, which are a major money market funding source), thereby fuelling further funding problems. The rise of "securitized fractional reserve banking" is not only observable in the rise of "shadow banking" but also in significant shifts in commercial banks' balance sheets. For example, bank assets and deposits had historically moved together, but data show a decoupling from the mid-1980s onwards as assets grew more than deposits (Figure 2 ). Comparing the liability side of US commercial banks in 1950 and 2007 demonstrates the decreasing importance of deposits for funding investments; in 1950, deposits made up 97% of liabilities compared with 66% in 2007. Most notable is the decrease in checkable deposits (against which reserve requirements are imposed) from 70% to 7% and the appearance of short-term financing including repos from almost nil to 13% ( Repos and other short-term loans give financial institutions access to "deposit"-like funding, where they pledge securities to the lender, generally institutional investors, such as asset managers (particularly money market funds) and other non-bank financial intermediaries. The securitization of loans (e.g., mortgages, credit card receivables, student loans) increased the amount of assets against which banks could obtain such funding. 14 The rise in leverage through repo funding was also prominent among brokers. For example, King (2008) estimated that, by September 2008, just before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, about 50% of brokers' assets were financed by repos. 15 Additionally, "rehypothecation" and "securities lending" enable banks, dealers and asset managers to obtain and provide funding from borrowed securities. Hedge funds, for example, often allow brokers to use their securities in return for funding and lower brokerage fees. The securities are not part of the bank's assets as they belong to the hedge fund, but they can be used by the bank as collateral to acquire funding. In the UK, the amount of customer securities that can be rehypothecated is unlimited and may even be used for proprietary trading by the prime broker. The US restricts this use and limits rehypothecation to 140% of the client's indebtedness to the broker (FSB, 2012; Singh & Aitken, 2010) . In securities lending, institutions with custodial responsibility for asset managers lend their clients' securities against cash (or other securities), thereby increasing the amount of securities available against which credit can be granted. 16 It is important to stress the tight and re-enforcing links between "shadow banking" and "traditional banking". Its separation is somewhat academic when in practice they are intertwined and often mutually reinforcing. For example, in the United States banks issue about 10% of "shadow-banking-like" liabilities (Harutyunyan, Massara, Ugazio, Amidzic, & Walton, 2015) . Moreover, commercial banks were the largest group of sponsors of off-balance sheet SIVs 17 and conduits that issued asset-backed commercial paper and invested in longer-term AAA asset-backed securities (Acharya, Schnabl, & Suarez, 2013; Thiemann, 2012) . The system's global span is illustrated by German Landesbanken, which were among the main buyers of US securitized loans. Additionally, with the advent of universal banking, large financial firms can be commercial in addition to investment banks and prime brokers and asset managers, all under one group. 18 Another example of the interlink between bank and non-bank credit creation is that balance sheet constrained banks are increasingly partnering with asset managers such as pension funds, mutual funds, private equity/credit funds and insurance companies to provide funding for warehousing credit risk (IMF, 2014) . Consequently, the distinction between "bank-based" and "market-based" lending is also increasingly blurry, when commercial banks finance their lending through market-based debt instruments and are themselves issuers of what has been described as "shadow money" (Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016; Pozsar, 2014) .
The size of the US shadow banking system grew from approximately US$ 3 trillion in 1990 to its peak of US$ 21 trillion of gross liabilities by mid-2008 and since the crisis it has retracted to approximately the same size as the traditional US banking sector with US$ 15 trillion in liabilities in 2011 . Measuring precisely the size of shadow banking continues to be a challenge due to different definitions as well as lack of data. Using broad measures, the US and European shadow banking both seem to have grown again to and past their pre-crisis levels (IMF, 2014) . 19 The size of the repo market is difficult to estimate because of the lack of official statistics and issues of double counting. Gorton and Metrick (2012) estimated it to be around US$ 10 trillion (p. 433), although Copeland et al. (2014) Under traditional banking, banks transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983 ) and perform a crucial role in the lubrication of the real economy. Today, liquidity is increasingly created outside the traditional banking sector. For example, Singh and Stella (2012) emphasized the importance of "leveragelike elements" that stem from the pledged collateral market to the overall financial lubrication of the monetary world (p. 14). "Ultimate liquidity" should include "money-like assets", which are defined as central bank deposits (reserves) plus good collateral that can be converted into central bank deposits at no haircut. Their calculations show that, in the United States, the "ultimate liquidity leverage", defined as the ratio of "total financial intermediaries' liabilities" to "ultimate liquidity", rose exponentially prior to the subprime crisis (from 4 at the end of 1951 to 673 at the end of 2006). 20 As assets become more "money-like" the higher their credit quality and their transferability, the securitization of illiquid loans into AAA-rates securities and the development of an active secondary market through broker-dealers was crucial to the rise of both liquidity and leverage. Adrian and Shin (2009) find that, in the context of secured lending, "liquidity" is best understood as the growth of intermediaries' balance sheets. "When liquidity dries up, it disappears altogether rather than being allocated elsewhere. When haircuts rise, all balance sheets shrink in unison, resulting in a generalized decline in the willingness to lend" (Adrian & Shin, 2009, p. 603) . Consistent with the rise of the securitized fractional reserve banking, they argue that monetary aggregates such as M2 are good indicators of the aggregate size of leveraged institutions only "in a hypothetical world where deposit-taking banks are the only intermediaries." Instead, they suggested "market-based liabilities such as repos and commercial paper as better indicators of credit conditions that influence the economy" (2009, p. 604) . In this market-based system, financial intermediaries engage in maturity transformations as well as "reverse" maturity transformations by using long-term savings held with asset managers to fund short-term loans/debt securities (Pozsar & Singh, 2011) .
It is generally accepted that highly liquid financial markets benefit the real economy by reducing transaction costs and improving access to credit. Credit creation is essential for entrepreneurs and growth, as perhaps most famously argued by Schumpeter (Schumpeter, [1912 (Schumpeter, [ ], 1934 . Following Schumpeter, Biondi (2013) argued that Minsky's "hedge finance" can be attributed to a stationary circular flow economy, which prevents entrepreneurial activity and economic development from arising. He concludes that fractional reserve banking (or currency issuance) is required in order to "introduce a dynamic leverage on that hedged flow bound to ownership and wealth" (p. 157). Consequently, traditional fractional reserve banking is a leveraging of existing assets (ownership and wealth). Banks create liquidity through maturity transformation and the issuance of deposits by granting loans. This benefit is perceived to outweigh the risk of a bank run, which can be mitigated by deposit insurance and a "lender of last resort". In the present context of credit creation in securitized fractional reserve banking, the Federal Reserve has additionally assumed the function of "dealer of last resort" (Mehrling, 2011) , providing market liquidity by bidding for risky assets that serve as collateral. The central bank thereby insures "not the payments that the debtor had promised to make but rather the market value of the promise itself" (Mehrling, 2011, p. 134) . 21 The caveat is that this can support the value of collateral securities, but it also reduces their availability.
If, as argued above, credit creation in traditional banking allows for the introduction of dynamic leverage of wealth, securitized fractional reserve banking allows for an even higher degree of leverage. Dealers provide market liquidity, which in turn facilitates funding liquidity as the most liquid securities qualify, in general, as collateral for credit creation. The securitization of assets, and more generally the ability to create tradable instruments from otherwise illiquid assets, has been key in developing deep and liquid financial markets. Although it appeared to merely distribute risk throughout the financial system, securitization effectively transformed the nature of risk from credit risk to liquidity risk (Amato & Fantacci, 2012) . Echoing our description of securitized fractional reserve banking, Fantacci (2013) argued that the current structure of monetary and financial institutions has made money and credit tradable through ever more liquid financial markets (p. 344). Moreover, rehypothecation increases liquidity by allowing for the multiple uses of collateral assets. Securitized fractional reserve banking thus increases credit creation and liquidity by (i) expanding the amount of collateral through the creation of financial assets, (ii) leveraging those assets multiple times through rehypothecation and securities lending, and (iii) shifting trust from the ability to repay to the ability to refinance (Table 2) . 
A local perturbation with global repercussions
When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, it triggered a systemic banking crisis and significant price drawdowns in stocks and other asset classes. What was originally perceived as just a local US subprime crisis, developed into a global financial crisis and the "Great Recession". From the perspective of our asset-based framework, we can observe a contraction of the three variables both at the institutional as well as at the macro level. It also demanded an extension of its master agreements to include its relationships with all Lehman entities (not just LBI), significantly extending JPMorgan's rights to request and retain collateral. Two days later, JPMorgan raised increasing concerns about the quality and valuation of the collateral assets and requested another US$ 5 billion in collateral (Valukas, 2010 (Valukas, , pp. 1068 (Valukas, -1071 . Finally, on September 15, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and triggered the worst financial crisis in recent history. This sequence of events shows the unfolding of a crisis at the company level when credit contracts across the three variables reflected in decreasing assets accepted as collateral, lower leverage (i. e. higher margins), and deteriorating levels of trust and confidence. This is echoed in the conclusion that "Lehman failed because it was unable to retain the confidence of its lenders and counterparties and because it did not have sufficient liquidity to meet its current obligations" (Valukas, 2010, p. 16) .
As the subprime crisis of 2007 unfolded, the demand for higher margins and a decrease in acceptable collateral assets was observable also in the markets. Haircuts on subprime-related collateral increased from previously zero to 100% by the end of 2008, meaning that subprime assets were no longer accepted as repo collateral. After an initially gradual increase in margins toward 20% by mid-2008, consecutive shifts occurred suddenly to over 50% and 100% (Gorton & Metrick, 2010, p. 513) , resembling regime shifts in confidence. As counterparties needed to raise cash to meet higher margins or to close repos, they were forced to deleverage and sell assets. The sell-off in assets decreased the value of the collateral, inducing further haircuts and more asset sales. Consequentially, funding liquidity and market liquidity became mutually reinforcing within a liquidity spiral (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009 ). The subprime crisis subsequently spread across other asset classes despite sound collateral and to other financial institutions in a global system-wide contraction along the three variables of credit creation. The contagion took place primarily through liquidity and risk premium channels (Longstaff, 2010) . The resulting flight to quality reduced the amount of eligible collateral for repo financing (asset-backed or corporate collaterals were no longer accepted). Singh (2012) estimated the shortage of collateral to have reduced liquidity by US$ 4-5 trillion. Moreover, as trust receded, the availability of repo financing was reduced to ever-shorter maturities, such as days and weeks (Hördahl & King, 2008) . As more financial firms started to have liquidity problems, they became caught in a spiral and were forced to sell assets in order to raise liquidity, which in turn decreased collateral prices and further increased selling pressure.
The fact that not only subprime-related securities but also asset-backed securities in general were affected by increased haircuts and lower prices suggests that a lack of trust rather than changing fundamentals was the driver of changes in those asset values. In a similar vein, Milne (2009) argued that the unfolding banking crisis was not so much a consequence of over-lending and bad assets, but one of a lack of trust and confidence, as the consequence of increasingly risky maturity transformation by banks borrowing short and lending long. The mechanisms he proposed to restore this trust are large-scale government insurance guarantees against credit losses and the unorthodox monetary policy of asset purchases. 22 In fact, central banks and governments attempted to reinstall trust and confidence by increasing liquidity or by broadening insurances. One example is the almost unison extension of government guarantees of deposits in order to avoid the bank run on securitized banking to spread into the traditional retail banking sector. 23 Moreover, central banks such the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and more recently the European Central Bank engaged in historically unprecedented large scale asset purchases known as "quantitative easing". Although the longerterm consequences of these measures remain to be seen, particularly for the real economy, they were largely successful in calming the capital markets and keeping interest rates low.
In summary, prior to the burst of the subprime mortgage bubble, financial markets were "highly liquid" and "highly leveraged". Liquid financial markets are generally seen as facilitating economic growth by efficiently directing capital to the real economy (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 2001 ). However, Berger and Bouwman (2012) measured bank liquidity creation and found that high liquidity creation (relative to trend) helps predict future financial crises. Contrary to having been a liquidity crisis, it appears to have been a crisis caused by too much liquidity (Biondi, 2010; Fantacci, 2013) . In similar spirit, Borio (2014) argued that the current international monetary and financial system amplifies the key weakness of national monetary and financial systems, namely to produce "excess financial elasticity", which leads to credit and asset booms and busts, systemic banking crises and macroeconomic dislocations. 24 The presence of a highly liquid financial system is consistent with our asset-based framework of credit creation, where increasing liquidity leads to the build-up of internal instabilities, translating into a maturation of the whole system towards "criticality". When the system reaches its critical point, a small perturbation is enough to initiate a regime change and a multitude of events can trigger a change of regime. The relatively local event of the US subprime crisis of 2007 and the much larger global financial crisis is an example of such an occurrence. The unfolding events suggest that at the heart of the contraction in credit (or liquidity) is diminishing trust and positive feedbacks. This can be triggered by fundamental losses, but it can consequently be amplified through feedbacks between asset prices, fire sales and safety margins as described above. Con-sequently, we can observe a mutually reinforcing retraction along the suggested three key variables of credit creation, both observable at the individual institutional level and in the wider financial system. Credit creation in securitized fractional reserve banking is particularly prone to the build-up of endogenous instabilities because of the positive feedbacks between the value of collaterals and liquidity (Corsi & Sornette, 2014 ). In contrast to the equilibrium view of demand and supply, where demand for a good reduces as its price increases, demand for financial assets often increases as their prices rise, thus fuelling the expectation that their prices will rise further. This makes the leveraging of financial assets particularly procyclical and financial markets prone to speculative bubbles. 25 4 Toward a universal framework of credit creation
Centuries of credit-driven booms and busts
In his study of 5000 years of human societies, Graeber (2011) found that debt, as a key component of societies and a driving force of development, has everywhere and in all times grown to unstable proportions, the ends of the spiralling debt cycles being characterized by "jubilees", i. e., some kind of global debt pardon occurring every one or two generations. Moreover, he found that credit systems existed prior to physical money. If credit has played such an important role throughout history, following recurrent expansions and subsequent collapses, is it not necessary to derive an understanding of credit creation that is independent of the prevailing monetary and financial system? In their analysis of eight centuries of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) found that "we have been here before. The instruments of financial gain and loss have varied over the ages, as have the types of institutions that have expanded mightily only to fail massively. But financial crises follow a rhythm of boom and bust through the ages. Countries, institutions, and financial instruments change across time, but human nature does not" (xxvii, our emphasis).
We demonstrated above that securitized fractional reserve banking was a crucial development prior to the global financial crises and argued that it is particularly prone to positive feedbacks and consequentially to asset booms and busts. Moreover, we argued that, just like traditional banking creates deposits, this system creates money on the form of securities. Biondi (2010) argued that, in the current financial and economic system, money is best understood "as a socio-economic medium without intrinsic content" (p. 35) and that accounting should be dynamically capturing the economic and monetary process generated over time. "The ownership of invested money is irrelevant in the case of money interest, because the bank system's collective action creates money endogenously, without connection to an existing base of capital, money or gold" (p. 48). We suggest that there is always an existing base, that of tangible and intangible assets serving explicitly or implicitly as collateral. Perhaps our current financial system is not as unique as we think. Some financial instruments, like credit default swaps and later synthetic collateralized debt obligations, were indeed new inventions developed during the rise of securitized banking. However, the use of financial innovation in order to facilitate credit is far from new. For example, Baptist (2012) found that financial innovation in the 1820s and 1830s, specifically the developments of new debt instruments and the securitization and mortgaging of slaves, was crucial to the development of the international boom in the cotton industry. 26 Just as increasing speculation in real estate preceded the global financial crisis, speculation in slave labor fuelled the financial and economic boom of the 1830s, which ultimately led to the Panic of 1837 (Rothman, 2011) . The ability to use private property (land, housing, slaves) as collateral for loans gave farmers access to credit. The general ability to use private assets as collateral for credit creation has been credited with explaining the extraordinary success of capitalism in modern Western economies (De Soto, 2001) .
It is also not a new phenomenon that credit creation preceding a financial crisis was financed by nonbank lenders. For example, the mortgaging of slaves in the nineteenth century was financed primarily through informal credit networks, which operated alongside rather than through the emerging banking system (Martin, 2010) . Another example is the seventeenth century tulip mania that, according to Kindleberger (1978) , was fuelled by credits not from banks but from sellers of the bulbs (p. 64). The point is that, throughout history, credit creation preceded asset booms, independent of whether credit was extended through merchants, commercial banks or shadow banks. From our perspective, an "asset-based" understanding of credit creation could capture the essential underlying dynamics, independent of the existing institutional frameworks. It presents an alternative understanding to credit creation "from prior deposits" and credit creation "out of nothing". From this perspective, the history of finance and money can be interpreted as a chain of innovations to make use of the enormous but otherwise dormant universe of assets that are held explicitly or implicitly as collaterals in lending and in all sorts of financial transactions. 27 However, this asset-based framework of credit creation is subject to several important limitations and criticisms. Below we provide a brief discussion of what we believe to be the most important challenges and present avenues for future research.
Challenges, limitations and further research
The first pressing challenge is the quantification of our framework within a dynamic and non-linear model (see Rozendaal, Malevergne, and Sornette (2016) for a first attempt). One can envision several metrics for the three variables, with the caveat that they are strongly intertwined: acceptable assets depend on the level of trust, which in turn also influences the level of leverage. The three variables are mutually re-enforcing, which is different from mere correlation.
The level of trust and confidence could be measured, for example, by a combination of consumer, business and investor confidence indices, spreads on credit default swaps, the VIX volatility index, and rating upor downgrades. One possible trigger for the withdrawal of confidence could be when proxy signs, which investors use to assess a situation with incomplete knowledge, are found to diverge from the true economic state of the situation (Swedberg 2010; . The level of leverage could be captured by loan to value ratios, collateral margins, and debt-to-income ratios. Finally, the amount of assets acceptable as collateral could be estimated through the amount of highly rated and liquid securities outstanding, number of new businesses, new patents or new housing. It could be a function of turnover in those assets, a type of "velocity" through the selling, lending, and rehypothecating of existing assets. As argued before, the acceptability of assets is largely a function of the prevailing risk perception and expectations about the future, embedded in the regulations and conventions of a particular time. Consequently, the model will have to take into account the specific characteristics of the periods considered.
Apart from issues related to the availability and quality of data, aggregation may pose a particularly difficult challenge. Total credit creation at the macro-level cannot simply be added across different entities as, of course, someone's liability is always someone else's asset. Consequently, we may have to consider different levels of credit creation across institutional hierarchies separately. Moreover, it may prove useful to distinguish between financial and real assets, the former being essentially derivatives of the latter. In practice, however, this distinction may be difficult because real assets can essentially become financial assets through speculation (consider for instance real estate or even tulips). As always, the challenge in developing a good model, conceptual or quantitative, is to find the right level of simplicity and abstraction within a system that is essentially complex and emergent in nature.
The second important challenge relates to the determination of "the right amount" and "the right kind" of credit creation. Can we develop guidelines towards this end? The presented framework offers an alternative understanding to how credit is created and why it is inherently unstable. Determining the "right amount of credit" is difficult, not least because the growth of the economy is not a stable process (Lera & Sornette, 2016) because of exogenous factors as well as the endogenous fluctuations of innovations (Gabaix, 2011) . Even if it were possible to establish the optimal level of credit within an economy, the choice is more likely to be one of a range or a bandwidth of economic fluctuations between booms and busts that society is willing to accept in return for a desired growth rate. One option society may pursue is the design of controls such that financial bubbles burst much earlier, just like regularly and intentionally conducted wood-fires engineered in order to avoid much larger destruction (Minnich, 1983; Minnich & Chou, 1997) . The consequence may be that these much shorter boom periods result in smaller aggregate wealth growth (Louzoun, Solomon, Goldenberg, & Mazursky, 2003) . Ideally, financial innovations should promote technical innovations in the real economy but we cannot take for granted that they will necessarily do so. At the same time, technological innovations in the real economy can also develop into financial bubbles, consider for example the railway boom of 1840 in the UK to the ICT bubble bursting in 2000.
Financial bubbles can also constitute an important mechanism in the formation of innovation. The associated euphoria and optimism was central to Keynes's "animal spirits", without which there would be insufficient investment. He argued that animal spirits, rather than mathematical calculations, were the key drivers of entrepreneurial action (Keynes, 1936, Ch. 12) . Janeway (2012) shows that the innovation economy begins with discovery and culminates in speculation, with continuous positive feedback loops between them. In this context, asset bubbles can be beneficial in the long-term by developing a social climate that pushes investors to take risks that they would never have taken otherwise by using a rational cost-benefit analysis (Gisler & Sornette 2009; .
Ultimately, to be sustainable, the economic surplus to pay for the cost of credit (interest) has to be generated in the real economy. Profits from capital gains on financial assets may increase GDP through a wealth effect but these are not sustainable, as the positive feedback between demand and asset prices leads to asset bubbles that can no longer be justified by the fundamental growth in the economy. In this scenario, asset prices rise faster than real GDP. Sornette and Cauwels (2014) documented a sequence of financial bubbles and an underlying trend away from productivity-based growth toward gains based on debt and finance since the 1980s. The belief that value can be extracted "out of nothing", namely from financial profits and debt rather than productivity and innovation, has been described as the "illusion of the perpetual money machine" (Sornette & Cauwels, 2014) . The use of credit may be relevant with respect to financial stability and real economic growth. For example, Werner (2005) argued for the need to distinguish between "credit for production", which increases GDP in the long-term, "credit for speculation", which merely drives up asset prices, and "credit for consumption", which increases GDP in the short-term and tends to drive inflation up. This conceptual distinction between productive and unproductive credit creation was already present in Schumpeter, who differentiated between a primary wave of credit creation financing innovations and secondary wave financing consumption, overinvestment and speculation (Bezemer, 2014) . However, the difficulty is that these categories are not always easy to determine or to distinguish.
The final avenue for future research that we would like to address is the need to develop a deeper understanding of credit creation within different institutional frameworks. We have argued that securitized fractional reserve banking is particularly prone to the development of asset bubbles. However, asset bubbles can develop with bank-issued credit and with nonbank-issued credit. What exactly are the tradeoffs between credit creation in different banking regimes with respect to economic growth and financial stability? And how are the regimes influenced by external factors such as regulation or accounting conventions? Our analysis focused primarily on US data, where finance has historically been more market-than bank-based. Mettenheim (2013) correctly pointed out that banks in market-centered finance capitalism are paradoxically both paradigm and outliers. Although much research has focused on market-based finance, most European banking systems are not only more bank-centered, they also continue to rely on savings and cooperative banks in addition to private banks. However, Mettenheim (2013)'s praise for traditional deposit-and loan-based banking for better smoothing economic shocks may be premature. Although banks have been found to cushion business cycle fluctuations better than markets, there is some evidence that, when recessions coincide with financial crises, the impact on GDP is three times as severe as in market-based economies (Gambacorta, Yang, & Tsatsaronis, 2014) . Moreover, the trend towards increasingly market-based credit creation appears to be a broader phenomenon that is not just particular to the US banking system. For example, Hardie and Howarth (2013) find that European commercial banks have, in general, become increasingly "market-based", both in terms of their own funding and with respect to their lending decisions. Additionally, data shows that the share of commercial banks in the aggregate total assets of the financial sector in the euro area decreased from 58.1% in 1999 to 50.9% in 2013 while the share of other financial intermediaries increased from 41.9% to 49.1%. During the same period, total assets of all financial intermediaries grew in both the United States as well as the euro area to 423% of GDP and 565% of GDP respectively (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014) . Hence, if there is a trend towards securitized fractional reserve banking even in historically bank-centered economies, we need a better understanding of the key drivers behind this trend and how institutional as well as regulatory differences influence financial stability.
Conclusion
This article introduced a conceptual framework of credit creation that depends on the amount of eligible collateral assets, the level of leverage and the level of trust and confidence in future cash flows. The associated dynamics are non-linear and subject to positive feedbacks, which give rise to endogenously generated instabilities. By building on the works of previous authors that underlined instabilities associated with credit, we proposed that, as credit expands along these variables, the financial system becomes more liquid and vulnerable to internally generated instabilities manifested as booms and busts.
Consequently, we applied this framework to the global financial crisis. We showed that the decades preceding the crisis were characterized by strong growth in financial assets, increasing leverage relative to GDP and a false sense of security as evident in the concept of the "Great Moderation". Using US flow of funds data, we demonstrated a shift in the components of US banks' balance sheets and a decoupling of bank assets from deposits since the mid-1980s. We described this as "the rise of securitized fractional reserve banking", where credit creation takes place not only within traditional commercial banking but within the global financial markets, including the shadow banking system. Whereas traditional banks create deposit-money through granting loans, market-based finance creates money-like securities. Both systems are fractional and subject to bank-runs. As a result, central banks transitioned from being lender of last resort to being dealers of last resort, as characterized by unprecedentedly large asset purchasing programs. We argued that, over the past century, collateral assets became increasingly financial in nature. As assets were increasingly leveraged, the financial system became more liquid, performing maturity transformations across different asset classes and timescales. However, it also became increasingly pro-cyclical due to positive feedbacks between asset prices and their demand. We argued that, as financial markets become more complete through credit creation, inherent instabilities build up and even a small external perturbation can have large repercussions on financial stability, transmitting from the financial markets to the real economy. From this perspective, the subprime crisis was only one possible trigger in an increasingly unstable financial system. As trust receded, so did the amount of assets acceptable as collaterals as well as the level of leverage and liquidity. Subsequent measures by policymakers can be interpreted as attempts to avoid further contraction along the three dimensions of acceptable assets, leverage and trust.
Finally, we discussed the possibility of a universal asset-based understanding of credit creation. Within this framework, credit is never "out of nothing" as it is implicitly or explicitly always backed by collateral assets. We suggested that this perspective may reconcile the fact that credit has been a key driver of booms and busts over centuries (independent of the prevailing financial and monetary system) and that credit existed before money. We pointed out challenges associated with this framework and proposed avenues for future research.
13 For a literature review, a discussion of the reasons for shadow banking, and illustrations of some of its mechanics see for example Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) and Claessens et al. (2012) . In our view, the bigger picture behind the rise of shadow banking is the "Great Leveraging" (Taylor, 2012) and the "Illusion of the Perpetual Money Machine" (Sornette & Cauwels, 2014) , the belief that economic growth can be created through financial profits rather than productivity and innovation in the real economy. The securitization and structuring of loans was just one instrument of many to enable essentially debt-financed economic growth since the mid 1980s in most advanced economies. 14 Interestingly, repos and securitizations per se are not "new" innovations. In the US, repos have been used since 1918 as the main tool of the Federal Reserve, and they only started being used more broadly by investment banks from the mid-1980s onwards (Choudry, 2010) . Similarly, the use of mortgage-backed securities goes as far back as the 18th century but it also became more widely used during the 1980s. Milne (2009) attributed the shift from "retail" toward "wholesale" funding of banks to international capital flows (p. 39). The countries that rely least on wholesale funding are major exporters of goods and natural resources with current account surpluses such as Germany, Japan, and Canada. 15 Note that banks' balance sheets do not reflect the full extent of short-term financing, as instruments can be both an asset and a liability and are netted across multiple assets and counterparties under the US GAAP. Nevertheless, it is possible to follow the use of gross repo financing in the footnotes from the 10-Q forms required of listed companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission (see King, 2008) . 16 The three largest custodians are Bank of New York Mellon with US$ 26 trillion in assets under custody (as of June 2013), and JPMorgan and State Street each with about US$ 18 trillion US in assets under custody (as of December 2012). From http://www.globalcustody.net/us/custody_assets_worldwide/. 17 SIV: special investment vehicle 18 Although US holding companies are forbidden from transferring cash from a sister company to the prime-broker arm, a "left-over" from the Glass -Steagall Act (King, 2008) . 19 Note that this is the case despite a significantly lower (and in Europe almost non-existent) issuance of securitized loans (ABS, RMBS, CMBS, CDOs etc.) . 20 This leverage ratio has since fallen back to levels last seen at the beginning of the 1980s (around 30). 21 Mehrling (2012b) argued that, in a market-based credit system, monetary policy must focus on asset markets rather than on banking institutions and on market liquidity rather than funding liquidity. Therefore, the central bank must become the "dealer of last resort" rather than the lender of last resort. Bagehot (1906) rule to "lend freely but at a high price" during a crisis should be adapted to buy and sell securities freely, albeit at a wide spread. Rather than supporting a subset of too-big-to-fail banks, the central bank should focus on the liquidity support of a subset of good securities, honoring Bagehot's principle to lend only "against all good banking securities." 22 Rather than this being understood as a bailout of banks (giving them money), this should be understood as investment to obtain a return. "Governments should do this because private investors are scared and will not provide funds. But government should not hesitate because they, alone, have the deep pockets that will allow them to make good returns from these investments and stabilize the financial and economic system to boot" (Milne, 2009, p. 326) . Of course, this makes the rather big assumption that Governments, or more precisely the taxpayers, will realize a positive return on their investment. An example to the contrary is the UK Treasury's sale of part of its shares in Royal Bank of Scotland at a loss. 23 For example, the United States increased its deposit insurance from US$ 100,000 to US$ 250,000, effective October 2008; the states of the European Union extended their insurance to 50,000 euros in June 2009 and 100,000 in December 2010; in the UK, deposit insurance was raised from 35,000 to 50,000 pounds in October 2008. In several cases, these extended insurances were coupled with political (not legally binding) statements from government officials to provide unlimited support. 24 Nevertheless, the general response by central banks has been to provide whatever liquidity necessary to prevent the system from collapsing and to provide impulses for new credit creation for the real economy. Unprecedented large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank illustrate their transition from "lenders of last resort" to "dealers of last resort". 25 For example, Adrian and Shin (2010) found that broker-dealers increase (decrease) leverage in line with larger balance sheets, given higher (lower) mark-to-market valuations of their assets and increased net worth (in contrast to households, where leverage tends to be high when balance sheets are small). Yan, Woodard, and Sornette (2012) found that, preceding the market crash of 2008, the repo market exhibited all the features of bubble behavior preceding the burst. 26 The importance of slavery in the US economy at that time is made clear in Piketty (2014) book in which he writes: "the total market value of slaves represented nearly a year and a half of US national income in the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, which is roughly equal to the total value of farmland" (pp. 143-144). 27 To borrow an analogy from physics, we argue that credit (like matter) is not created out of nothing; assets (like energy) overwhelmingly pre-exist any transaction and process. The simple idea is that energy is essentially omnipresent and matter is created from energy that is manifested at a specific frequency. Similarly, we are surrounded by an unlimited potential of assets, and the act of considering some assets as eligible for collateral gives rise to the creation of credit. Just like matter is a form of energy, credit is also a form of asset. However, matter cannot exist in the absence of energy and, we argue, neither can credit in the absence of assets.
